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The Guarantee of Republican Government:
Proposals for Judicial Review
The Constitution provides that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of government."' The Supreme Court generally has held that only Congress and the President, and not the federal judiciary, can enforce
that guarantee-on the ground that all issues under the guarantee
clause raise nonjusticiable "political questions. '2 But several rulings in state and lower federal courts, like some older Supreme
Court opinions, have disregarded that per se rule and decided
guarantee clause claims on the merits.3 The anomalous result is
that a duty entrusted to "the United States" is exercised in large
part by state courts.4
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1. For the background and the history of the clause, see
William M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution (1972); Arthur E. Bnfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude,
46 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300
U.S. 608 (1937); Ohio v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930); Davis v. Ohio, 241 U.S. 565
(1916); Pacific Telephone v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham
(No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
On "political questions" generally, see, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-26 (discussing categories of "political questions" and factors underlying them); Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 3-16 at 71-79 (1978); Louis Henkin, Is There A "Political Question"
Doctrine?, 85 Yale L. J. 597 (1976); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question Doctrine: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517 (1966).
3 State court decisions include, e.g., In re Interrogatories H.B. 1078, 189 Colo. 1, 536
P.2d 308 (1975) (separation of powers not required by guarantee); People v. Horan, 192
Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976) (same); Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223
(1973) (separation of powers required); Heimerl v. Ozaukee Cty., 256 Wis. 151, 40 N.W.2d
564 (1949) (taxation for private purposes forbidden). Federal court decisions include, e.g.,
Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc) (judicial immunity required); Hoxie
School Dist. v. Brewer, 137 F.Supp. 364 (E.D. Ark. 1956) (guarantee protects school officials
implementing desegregation plan). Older Supreme Court cases include, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) (female suffrage not required).
4 See Walter Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 54, 86 (1931): "If observance of the federal provision guaranteeing a republican form
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This comment rejects the per se rule of nonjusticiability and
urges judicial review of some state action under the guarantee
clause. Part I reviews the case law and finds ample precedent for
judicial review under the guarantee clause. Part II examines the
factors that define "political questions" and concludes that they
cannot fully account for the treatment of guarantee clause challenges as per se nonjusticiable. Rather, the Court's refusal to measure state action against the guarantee of a republican form of government reflects a refusal adequately to consider the substantive
content of the clause.
Part III interprets the guarantee clause according to the framers' understanding of republican government as a structural remedy for the competing evils of factional rule by the electorate on
the one hand, and authoritarian government or monarchy on the
other. It identifies the prime guarantee clause values as ensuring
political accountability and deliberative decision making in state
governments. Part IV applies these principles to urge strengthened
judicial review in three specific areas. Courts should limit state delegation of legislative power, place some constraints on initiatives
and referenda, and subject state regulation to meaningful rationality review.

of government is not subject to inquiry in federal courts, it would seem more clearly beyond

the authority of state courts."
A further anomaly is that a clause committed to "the United States," not to any particular branch, should be unenforceable by the judiciary, which generally has the right and
"duty" to interpret the meaning of the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803).
5 For other arguments against the nonjusticiability rule, see Bonfield, 46 Minn. L. Rev.
513 (cited in note 1); Arthur Earl Bonfield, Baker v. Car. New Light on the Constitutional
Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 245, 254-62 (1962) (suggesting guarantee clause analysis of malapportionment sanctioned by state constitutions); John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 118 n.* (1980) (suggesting guarantee clause analysis in reapportionment cases); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 18-19 (1971) (same); James J. Seeley, The
Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: A Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55
Cornell L. Rev. 881, 905-10 (1970) (suggesting use of guarantee clause to invalidate racially
discriminatory referenda and initiatives); Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New
Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause, 93 Yale L. J. 561, 565-80 (1984) (suggesting use of
guarantee clause to confer federal jurisdiction over claims that a state has violated its own
laws); Note, A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 681, 696-99 (1981) (suggesting use of guarantee clause to remedy defects in state government structures that result
in violations of individual rights).
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COMPETING TRADITIONS

The Nonjusticiable Cases

For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has with few exceptions held the guarantee clause nonenforceable in federal court.
The line of authority begins with Luther v. Borden,6 in which the
Court refused to decide which of two factions in a political upheaval in Rhode Island was the proper government. Chief Justice
Taney's opinion rested on two grounds: first, the drastic effects of
a declaration that the existing government was invalid;7 and second, the constitutional commitment of the issues raised to Congress and the president,8 whose decisions the Court would not
question.9 In particular, the Court held, Congress has the exclusive
power and duty to determine whether a state government is republican in form.' 0
48 U.S. 1 (1849). Luther was a trespass case in which the defendants claimed to have
acted under the authority of martial law. The near-civil war in Rhode Island in the 1840s
grew out of a dispute between adherents of the existing freehold suffrage and proponents of
universal manhood suffrage. For accounts of this episode, see G. Dennison, The Dorr War
(1976); Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause at 86-110 (cited in note 1); Arthur May Mowry, The
Dorr War (1901).
7 If the Court decided that the preexisting government had become invalid once its
opponents had adopted their own constitution, "then the laws passed by its (the pre-existing government's) legislature during that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; . . . and the judgments and sentences of its courts in civil and criminal cases null
and void." 48 U.S. at 38-39. The Court also referred to a lack of standards for resolving the
issue of which government was legitimate. Id. at 41.
8 Id. at 42-43. The case implicated the duty of the United States to "protect each
[state] . . . on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, cl. 3. While the
text of this clause no more commits the power exclusively to Congress than does the guarantee clause, congressional control over calling the militia indicates entrustment of this sphere
to Congress. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. Although there is little record of the framers'
intent, Edmund Randolph told the Virginia ratifying convention that protection against domestic violence would be the province of the "General Legislature." Wiecek, The Guarantee
Clause at 76-77 (cited in note 1). Similarly, presidential authority derives from the president's constitutional role as commander-in-chief, U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 1, and from
Congress's early delegation of authority to the president to call state militia to suppress
insurrections. Militia Act of 1792, reenacted in 1795 and 1807, now codified at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 331-32 (1982).
8 48 U.S. at 42-43.
10 Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For. . . Congress must necessarily decide what
government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican
or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the
councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional
authority. And its decision... could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.
Id. at 42.
0
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Above all, the Court seemed to fear that a decision on the
merits might bring the judiciary into conflict with the other federal
branches, and so the decision rested heavily on the extreme facts
presented.1 1 Nevertheless, in subsequent cases the Court relied on
Taney's broad dicta in Luther for the proposition that all issues
under the guarantee clause-whether presented by state12 or congressional13 action-were for political, not judicial, resolution.
In Pacific Telephone v. Oregon,14 the Court adopted a per se
rule of nonjusticiability for the guarantee clause in dismissing a
challenge to a tax authorized by direct voter initiative. 1 5 Treating
the guarantee clause attack on the initiative provision as a claim
that the whole state government had become illegitimate, 6 the
Court cited Luther as "absolutely controlling"' 7 and argued that
such a drastic remedy was both beyond judicial capability and constitutionally committed to Congress.'" Subsequent cases summarily
dismissed guarantee clause challenges on the authority of Pacific
Telephone.'9

The Court's conclusion thus rested on the congressional power to admit or refuse new
representatives. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 ("Each House shall be the judge of the elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members").
U During the crisis, President Tyler had declared the preexisting government to be the
lawful authority and had considered but had not yet approved sending federal troops to
support it. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause at 100-05 (cited in note 1). A contrary decision
for the plaintiff holding that the preexisting government was illegitimate would have flouted
the President's determination, and such a stand against presidential authority during the
moment of crisis simply might have been ignored.
12 See Taylor and Marshall, 178 U.S. at 578-79 (dismissing challenge to law authorizing
legislative panel to decide disputed gubernatorial elections).
" Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (1867) (dismissing challenge to congressional power to
set standards for former Confederate states seeking readmission to the Union, although
without direct reliance on Luther).
14 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
1 Under an initiative, voters propose legislation and vote on it directly; under a referendum, voters pass on measures proposed by the legislature. Both devices were prominent
Progressive reforms designed to return power to voters from state legislatures captured by
special interest groups. See generally Ellis Paxon Oberholzer, The Referendum in America
(1911).
'6 The Court said the claim was "that the adoption of the initiative and referendum
destroyed all government republican in form in Oregon.. . . And indeed the propositions go
further than this, since in their essence they assert that there is no governmental function,
legislative or judicial, in Oregon." 223 U.S. at 141.
7 Id. at 143.
Is "[This] contention, if held to be sound, would necessarily affect the validity, not only
of the particular statute which is before us, but of every other statute passed in Oregon
since the adoption of the initiative and referendum." Id. at 141. If the whole government
were declared invalid, new elections would have to be decreed and supervised and order
maintained in the interim, all tasks the Court said only Congress could perform. Id. at 142.
"' Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913) (injunctive suit against transmission of
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The Court's most recent guarantee clause decision, Baker v.
Carr,20 reaffirmed that the republican form guarantee is nonjusticiable, holding that courts must judge legislative reapportionment
by equal protection standards instead.21 But Baker changed the interpretive backdrop to the clause in two ways. First, the Court departed from previous analysis by focusing neither on the textual
commitment of the clause to Congress nor on the limits of the remedial powers available to the judiciary. Rather, the Court premised nonjusticiability on the lack of "judicially manageable standards" by which to judge state or congressional action.22 The Court
acknowledged that a "permanent" military government would "obviously" be unrepublican, but suggested that even at this extreme,
responsibility for enforcement of the guarantee clause would lie
only with Congress and not with the courts.23
Baker also introduced an important modification of the political question doctrine that narrowed, at least in theory, the range of
cases in which a guarantee clause challenge would be found to present a nonjusticiable political question. Basing the doctrine on the
federal separation of powers rather than on principles of federal2
ism,

4

the majority propounded six specific factors that determine

whether an issue is nonjusticiable as a "political question. ' 25 The
six factors invite careful and limited analysis of whether judicial
review is foreclosed in a particular case, rather than broad per se
proposed state constitution to voters for ratification); O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244, 248

(1915) (designation of drainage district); Davis, 241 U.S. at 569 (referendum provision);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1917) (workers' compensation
law); Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. at 79-80 (requirement that all but one state supreme court
justice concur in order to hold state law unconstitutional); Highland Farms Dairy, 300 U.S.
at 612 (delegation to agency to regulate milk distribution).
20 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21 Id. at 226-29. Justice Douglas, concurring, thought the plaintiff stated a guarantee
clause claim as well. Id. at 242 n.2.
2 Id. at 223. The Court did cite Luther for the proposition that the guarantee provided
no standards for a court to judge the validity of a state government.
23 Id. at 222 n.48.
24 Id. at 217.

25 The six factors are:

a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
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categorization: "unless one of these formulations is inextricable
from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability. ' ' 26 Subsequent cases have upheld the Court's authority to
engage in the expanded scope of judicial review that flows from a
narrower view of what constitutes a political question.27 Indeed, in
a later reapportionment case the Court specifically suggested that
28
not all guarantee clause issues are foreclosed from judicial review.
The Court has yet to follow its own suggestion, however, and the
rule in a great many state and federal courts remains that guaran29
tee clause issues are per se nonjusticiable.
B.

The Tradition of Justiciability

Some state and lower federal courts have reached the merits of
guarantee clause issues, although in most cases they have upheld
the challenged state action.3 0 Most have drawn their authority to
review the merits from both the narrowing of the "political question" doctrine after Baker v. Carr,3 1 and occasionally from the Supreme Court's own willingness to review guarantee clause claims in
a few early decisions.
1. The Supreme Court. In a few cases, the Court has disregarded the per se rule and has addressed the merits of guarantee
clause claims, invariably holding that the challenged action did not
abrogate the republican form. For example, the Court held that
the guarantee clause did not require female suffrage; 2 that deterId.
7 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (congressional judgment of qual-

26

ifications of members reviewable); Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (1986) (claims of legislative gerrymandering judicially cognizable). But contrast Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (passage of Panama Canal Treaty unreviewable); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1
(1973) (refusal to hear injunctive claim regarding training of Ohio National Guard that fired
on demonstrators at Kent State).
28 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964).
2' See, e.g., Byrd v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 587 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1979) (selection of
utility board members); City of Rome, Ga. v. United States, 472 F.Supp. 221, 241 (D.D.C.
1979); Cantor v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 353 F.Supp. 1307, 1315-16 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(adoption of court disciplinary rules); Brenner v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo., 315
F.Supp. 627, 628 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (memorandum opinion); Hobson v. Tobriner, 255
F.Supp. 295, 299 (D.D.C. 1966) (appointment of District of Columbia commissioners);
O'Keefe v. Atascadero Cty. Sanitation Dist., 21 Cal.App.3d 719, 726, 98 Cal.Rptr. 878, 884
(1971) (utility board composition); Jackman v. Bodine, 78 N.J.Super. 414, 188 A.2d 642
(Super. Ch. 1963) (malapportionment).
30 See cases cited in note 3 above.
31 See, e.g., Bauers, 361 F.2d at 589; Van Sickle, 212 Kan. at 436-39.
2 Minor, 88 U.S. at 175-77, which relied on the fact that no state in 1787, and no
subsequently admitted state as of 1875, provided for female suffrage at the time of
admission.
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mination of municipal boundaries by state courts, rather than by
the state legislature, did not violate the guarantee;3 3 and that a
state legislative act creating new school districts did not violate the
34
clause.
Language in In re Duncan" summarized the severely limited
range of situations in which the Court believed the guarantee
would justify federal intervention. The Court held the guarantee
was not violated because the state was still "in full possession of its
faculties" and was able to maintain sufficient order to fulfill its
governmental functions. 6
2. State and lower federal courts. Since Baker v. Carr, a few
courts have reached the merits of guarantee clause claims by limiting Supreme Court rulings of nonjusticiability to extreme situations where the Baker "political question" factors placed the issues
beyond judicial competence. Several courts that have interpreted
and applied the guarantee clause have -focused on the constraints
the clause might place on the structure of state government. For
example, two state supreme courts have divided over whether the
clause requires a state to observe separation of powers. In Van
37
Sickle v. Shanahan,
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
guarantee clause requires separation of powers, noting the importance of separated powers to the framers as a guard against abuse
of governmental force.38 But the court imposed an extremely lenient standard, upholding a constitutional amendment authorizing
the governor to reorganize the executive branch (a task ordinarily
within the legislative power) so long as "the representative charac"

Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897).
Kies v. Lowery, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905). The Court also reviewed two congressional
exercises of the guarantee power and struck them down under other constitutional provisions. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (right of states to admission on equal footing
under art. IV, § 3, cl. 1); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646 (1871) (contracts clause).
36 139 U.S. 449 (1891) (upholding a criminal conviction against a claim that the relevant criminal statutes had been invalidly enacted).
11 Id. at 461-62, citing Taylor and Marshall, 178 U.S. 548. The Court held that as long
as the people's rights to elect their own representatives and-through their own representatives-to pass their own laws remain untrammeled, the guarantee clause is satisfied. 139
U.S. at 461.
" 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973).
Van Sickle, 212 Kan. at 447. The court managed to reach this result without disagreeing with Supreme Court precedent. Luther was nonjusticiable, the Kansas court observed, only because the particular choice of one state government as legitimate was committed to Congress in its authority to admit and expel representatives. Id. at 436-39. And
Pacific Telephone was nonjusticiable because the plaintiff there attacked the state's authority as a whole. Id. at 439. In contrast, the claim in Van Sickle challenged only a particular
provision of the state constitution and implicated none of the "political question" factors
listed in Baker.
'"
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ter of the government still remains.""
The Colorado Supreme Court, by contrast, when faced with a
guarantee clause issue raised by a state constitutional amendment,
refused to subject the amendment even to lenient separation of
powers scrutiny.40 It argued that the guarantee was intended to
prevent only extreme cases of monarchy or insurrection in a
state.4 1
In Bauers v. Heisel,42 the Third Circuit identified state judicial immunity as "an indispensable element of a republican form of
government" and held that the guarantee clause barred congressional abrogation of that immunity by civil rights laws. 43 The
Court distinguished the nonjusticiability precedents as involving
"extraordinary circumstances" and suggested that some guarantee
clause issues should be justiciable after Baker."
Finally, in KohIer v. Tugwell,4" a three-judge panel reached
the merits of a guarantee clause claim but held that the use of a
confusing ballot to adopt a state constitutional amendment offended neither the guarantee clause nor the due process clause.
The majority believed that the due process clause incorporated the
standards of the guarantee clause and added: "Federal courts
should be loath to read out of the Constitution as judicially nonenforceable a provision that the Founding Fathers considered es46
sential to formulation of a workable federalism.
Whatever their precise positions, these courts, as well as other
federal and state courts, all appear to agree that the republican
form requirement places only minimal constraints on a state's

3, Id. at 450-51. The court focused on the provision in the amendment for legislative
veto of any reorganization by the governor. Id. But it also implied that even that check was
not necessary to save the amendment, quoting Madison that "it is only where 'the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possesses the whole power of
another department, [that] the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted.'" Id., quoting The Federalist Papers No. 47 at 302-03 (James Madison) (New Amer.
Lib. ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
40 In re Interrogatories H.B. 1078, 189 Colo. 1, 536 P.2d 308 (1975).

41

189 Colo. at 11-13.

361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966).
43 The case involved 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which provides a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. 361 F.2d at 588-89.
4
361 F.2d at 589.
45 292 F.Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1968).
41 Id. at 985 (Wisdom, J.) (emphasis in original). The third judge said the guarantee
claim was nonjusticiable. Id. at 982 (Rubin, J.). All three judges agreed the ballot was constitutional because it did not actively mislead voters or prevent them from voting. Id. at 981
(Rubin, J.).
42
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choice of government structure.4 7
II. THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS"

The consistent rejection of guarantee clause claims by those
courts that reach the merits suggests a strong functional vindication of the per se rule of nonjusticiability: if the only meritorious
guarantee clause claims are those barred by the political question
doctrine, there is no reason to depart from the per se rule. 48 On the

other hand, the decisions supporting a functional vindication of
the per se rule may rest on two errors in guarantee clause jurisprudence. First, courts may have overestimated the political question
problems raised by some guarantee clause challenges. Second,
courts may fail to perceive the real structural standards the guarantee clause imposes on the states, standards that a state may fail
to satisfy by governmental deviation from republican form far less
dramatic than a total breakdown of orderly process. This comment
argues that the political question concerns are less severe and the
substance of the guarantee clause is more demanding than most
courts have realized. When the clause is properly analyzed, a gap
opens between these two limits on judicial action within which
meritorious and justiciable guarantee clause claims may be
brought.
As mentioned, the first flaw of the per se nonjusticiability rule
is its reliance on an overbroad application of the political question
doctrine. As will be seen, this problem is in part caused by its second flaw, the assumption that the guarantee clause has only minimal substantive content.
47 Indeed, some courts have upheld state action on the ground that republicanism affirmatively protects, rather than overrides, majority decision making. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories H.B. 1078, 189 Colo.at 13 ("[W]hen the people speak through the amendment of
their constitution . . .then because of our devotion to the republican scheme of government, we are compelled to accept their decision"); Cantor, 353 F.Supp. 1307 (upholding

court rules because authorized by representative legislature). And although the guarantee
seems a grant of federal power, a few courts have held it actually limits federal intervention
in some core areas of state authority. See Dawson v. Vance, 329 F.Supp. 1320, 1326 (S.D.

Tex. 1971) (federal court injunction against state criminal prosecution would violate guarantee); United States v. Downey, 195 F.Supp. 581, 585 (S.D. ]M. 1961) (application of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to state prosecutions would violate guarantee). In a few cases,

however, courts have used the guarantee to invalidate state action that violates individual
rights not clearly protected by other constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Heimerl, 256 Wis.
151 (guarantee prohibits taxation for private purpose). But contrast State v. Lehtola, 55
Wis.2d 494, 198 N.W.2d 354 (1972) (guarantee does not prohibit commencing criminal prosecution by information).
48 Professor Henkin has called the guarantee clause "the prime example" of the "political question." Henkin, 85 Yale L. J. at 607 (cited in note 2).
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Textual Commitment to Another Branch

1. The weakness of the "textual commitment" argument.
Among the most prominent factors in "political question" analysis
is whether the Constitution provides "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. 4 9 Before Baker v. Carr,the Court relied heavily on the
conclusion, more asserted than argued, that the guarantee clause
was so committed by its text.5 0 But the case for "textual commitment" is weak, and in Baker the Court abandoned it. 51 The framers granted the guarantee power to "the United States," not to any
one branch; and they located the clause in article IV, which addresses various issues of federalism, rather than in articles I-III,
which define the powers of the respective branches. 52 Under Powell
v. McCormack,5 3 even article I's stipulation that "[e]ach house [of
Congress] shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members ' 54 does not commit that power to Congress to the exclusion of judicial review. 5 Textual foreclosure of
judicial enforcement therefore is even harder to derive from the
more general provision that "[t]he United States shall guarantee"
a constitutional requirement. Finally, a textual commitment to another branch is impossible to reconcile with those cases in which
the Court has decided guarantee clause claims on the merits.
What may underlie the "textual commitment" argument, however, is the recognition that guarantee clause enforcement often
will implicate other duties and powers that are exclusively assigned, by constitutional text or institutional competence, to the
executive or to Congress. For example, claims under the guarantee
clause often argue that a state government's fundamental structure
4' Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. In Powell, the Court suggested that this factor might be
conclusive: once the Court established after lengthy review that there was no textual commitment to Congress, see 395 U.S. at 518-48, it summarily disposed of the other "political
question" factors. See id. at 548-49. Powell is consistent with the spirit of Professor Wechsler's view that courts may decline jurisdiction only by finding that the Constitution bars
adjudication. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1959); Note, Political Questions-Classical or Discretionary Applications
of Judicial Review?, 4 Suffolk L. Rev. 127 (1969).
50 See, e.g., Pacific Telephone, 223 U.S. at 149-51, citing Luther, 48 U.S. 1.
5, Baker, 369 U.S. at 223 ("the only significance" of Luther is in establishing that the

guarantee "is not a repository of judicially manageable standards").
" See Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause at 76-77 (cited in note 1).
" 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

U.S. Const. art. I, § 5.
The Court in Powell concluded that Congress's discretion in seating members is limited to expulsion for failure to meet the age, citizenship, or residence requirements of article
I, § 2. 395 U.S. at 548.
"

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:208

is unrepublican and illegitimate, as in Luther v. Borden.56 Compliance with a judicial order in such a case may require actual or
threatened force, implicating presidential and congressional prerogatives to control use of the militia 57 and armed forces. 5 And
arguably, by accepting a state's representatives, Congress has endorsed the state government as fundamentally republican. Finally, a decree that a whole government or governmental branch is
illegitimate may require extensive restructuring and supervision;
the Court indicated in Luther and Pacific Telephone6 0 that these
powers may be beyond judicial competence.
This refusal to intervene under the guarantee clause where the
relief involves invalidating or restructuring state government is
problematic, especially since it ensures that the Court will not act
when action is most needed-when a state has flagrantly violated
republican principles. At least on a process-based theory of judicial
review, the protection of majority rule presents the strongest case
for judicial intervention, for when a government is unrepublican its
6
flaws probably are not self-correcting. '
The courts' abstention is not only substantively distressing
but also apparently peculiar to guarantee clause cases. Judicial
power to enforce the Constitution-as the reapportionment and
school desegregation cases make clear-often may encompass intrusive institutional and social reform in the face of ardent
majoritarian opposition. 2 When confronted with such opposition
to the Court's far-reaching decisions, congressional and presidential resort to force has nearly always supported rather than conIn Luther, the plaintiff asked for a declaration that the existing government lacked
any authority to act. 48 U.S. at 34-47.
57 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (power to provide for calling the militia to "execute the
laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions"). Congress delegated this
power to the president in 1792. See note 8 above. The president acts as commander-in-chief
of the state militia as well. U.S. Constitution art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
5 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (president is commander-in-chief of armed forces).
" But consider the holding in Powell, 395 U.S. at 548, discussed above in text accompanying notes 53-55. See also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court
1789-1888 at 256 (1986) (noting that Powell purports to enumerate the only factors on
which Congress can decide whether to accept representatives).
60 Luther, 48 U.S. at 47; Pacific Telephone, 223 U.S. at 141-42 (discussing "inconceivable expansion of the judicial power" that would follow).
:1 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 121-24 (cited in note 5).
'2 Baker itself and, more dramatically, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955), illustrate the point. Enforcement of the latter decision, of course, ultimately required
the deployment of federal troops at the president's direction. See generally Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes (1980).
56
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tested the judicial power to enforce the Constitution."
Courts also have more remedial flexibility today than in the
era of Pacific Telephone: declaratory judgments, delayed injunctions, and other measures can allow the parties time to conform to
far-reaching orders,6 4 and prospective orders can avoid unsettling
necessary government operations.6
Finally, even valid enforcement concerns do not justify a per
se rule-unless the only situations to which the guarantee clause
applies are those "extreme" situations involving the potential use
of force or the likelihood of violence, or questioning the legitimacy
of an entire state government. Thus the nonjusticiability rule can
only be explained by turning to the substance of the guarantee
clause itself.
2. The implicit substantive content. The Court has addressed the question of substance, explicitly or implicitly, in many
of the guarantee clause cases. Without exception, it has refused to
extend the substance of the guarantee of the republican government beyond the "extreme" cases. For example, in Taylor and
Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1),66 the Court upheld a state law authorizing a legislative panel to decide disputed gubernatorial elections against a challenge that this deprived the popular vote of its
force. The Court found that the extreme circumstances to which
the guarantee was directed had not arisen:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky is in full possession of its
faculties as a member of the Union, and no exigency has
arisen requiring the interference of the General Government
to enforce the guarantees of the Constitution, or to repel invasion, or to put down domestic violence. In the eye of the Constitution, the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the State are peacefully operating by the orderly and settled
67
methods prescribed by its fundamental law.
Much later, in a footnote in Baker v. Carr,Justice Brennan noted
that the guarantee clause could yield identifiable criteria of republicanism only at its "extreme limits"-for example, a permanent
63 See Bass, Unlikely Heroes at 149-53, 172-200 (cited in note 62).
64 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976) (discussing judges' increased power to mold remedies to fit
circumstances).
'6 Id. at 1288-1302.
66 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
61

Id. at 580.
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military government would offend the clause. 8
In other cases, this analysis, although implicit, is the only way
of making sense of the holding. For example, in Pacific Telephone,
the Court treated the defendant's challenge as directed at the legitimacy of the entire state government, although it could have
read it as addressing the initiative provision alone,6 9 as some courts
had done. 70 Current academic treatment of the reasoning in Pacific
Telephone is almost unanimously scornful, finding no basis for the
Court's assertion that the challenge must have been to the entire
government.7 1 But the reasoning is at least coherent, if not correct,
as an assumption about the substance of the republican form requirement. By proceeding as if the only relief available under the
guarantee clause were judicial overthrow of the existing government, the Court implicitly held that the scope of the guarantee's
prohibitions was limited to those "extreme" cases where such a
drastic order would be justified. Once the Court had characterized
all guarantee clause claims as of that extreme sort, it is not surprising that it embraced a per se rule of nonjusticiability.
In Davis v. Ohio,7 2 the Court further clarified this view of the
guarantee clause in characterizing a challenge to a referendum
provision:
It must rest upon the assumption that to include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is to introduce a
virus which destroys that power, which in effect annihilates
representative government and causes a State . . . to be not
68 Baker, 369 U.S. at 222 n.48, citing Luther, 48 U.S. at 45. However, Brennan then
added a "Catch-22": that in precisely such circumstances the issue might be committed to
Congress, presumably because of the difficulties in enforcement outlined above. 369 U.S. at
222 n.48.
49 Bonfield, 46 Minn. L. Rev. at 554-55 (cited in note 1). The defendant's brief actually
claimed the initiative had "destroyed" the legislature, Pacific Telephone, 223 U.S. at 139
n.1; thus the Court simply declined to consider a less extreme claim not presented. But if
this was simply the particular defendant's claim, it could provide no basis for a per se rule,
other than a rule precluding judical evaluation of the entire structure of state government.
A bar to more limited challenges rests instead on an interpretation of the substantive scope
of the clause.
70 Several courts had already upheld referenda and initiatives on the merits. See, e.g.,
Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Ore. 454 (1910); Hopkins v. City of Duluth, 81 Minn. 189 (1900).
The Oregon Supreme Court in Pacific Telephone upheld the initiative on the strength of
Kiernan. See Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause at 265 (cited in note 1). The Delaware Supreme Court reached the contrary result on the merits in Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. 479, 497-98
(1847) (striking referendum as form of direct popular rule forbidden by guarantee clause).
71 See, e.g., Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 118-19 n.* (cited in note 5) (decision rooted
in a "category mistake"), citing generally Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause at 264-69 (cited in
note 1); Bonfield, 46 Minn. L. Rev. at 553-56 (cited in note 1).
72 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
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republican in form in violation of the guarantee of the
Constitution."
Again, the claim was treated as challenging the legitimacy of the
legislative branch as a whole, and the Court easily dismissed that
as nonjusticiable 4
Many of the guarantee clause cases, therefore, can be explained on the same grounds that Professor Henkin has offered for
other "political questions": the Court has determined that the
challenged actions did not violate the minimal requirements of the
guarantee clause. 75 This determination obviously has nothing to do
with the textual commitment of the guarantee power. It is the
Court's failure to develop a meaningful conception of the republican principle embodied in the clause, rather than the political
question doctrine, that has relegated the guarantee clause to
desuetude.
B.

Judicially Manageable Standards

1. Lack of standards as a threshold issue. The Court has
often dismissed challenges to the guarantee clause as a threshold
matter on the ground that the clause fails to provide the standards
necessary for enforcement. The Court's preference for this characterization of the justiciability issue7 6 may be attributable to several
factors. First, threshold dismissals save the Court the difficult task
of developing and supporting principles under a clause with no certain bounds.7 7 Second, dismissals on jurisdictional grounds may
discourage future claims more effectively than will full opinions
with language availing future distinctions.7 8 Third, for many years
the Court had no means other than jurisdictional dismissals to dis79
pose of cases summarily without full briefing and argument.
Yet, as Professor Cass Sunstein has argued in the administra73

Id. at 569 (emphases added).

7'

Id.

Henkin, 85 Yale L. J. at 622-25 (cited in note 2).
For example, in Baker v. Carr the Court rejected application of the guarantee clause,
determining that the clause provides "no judicially manageable standards," 369 U.S. at 223,
and instead relied on the equal protection clause to analyze reapportionment cases because
its standards, in contrast, "are well developed and familiar," id. at 226.
77 Id. at 226.
78 See Philippa Strum, The Supreme Court and "Political Questions": A Study in Judicial Evasion 35 (1974).
71 See Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert Wechsler, Hart
and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 645 (2d ed. 1973) (discussing
adoption of rule in 1928 requiring statement establishing probable jurisdiction on appeal
from state courts).
71
76
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tive context, at the extreme, holdings of nonreviewability are difficult to distinguish from decisions finding no violation on the merits.80 In both cases, the holding is that the provision in question
contains no standards applicable to the particular action
challenged. 8 '
2. Administrability of standards. In some "political question" cases, however, a different contention emerges: not that there
are no identifiable standards applicable to the issue at hand, but
that applying the available standards would be unmanageable in a
judicial forum.
One early instance in which the Court displayed its concern
8 2
with judicially unmanageable standards was Coleman v. Miller,
in which it refused to decide whether time had expired for ratification of the Child Labor Amendment. There was little dispute over
the applicable standard; previous decisions had established that an
amendment would lose its "vitality" and could not be ratified if
more than a "reasonable" length of time had passed since its proposal."' But the Court refused to try to apply such a nebulous
standard, as it would require receiving in evidence "a great variety
of relevant conditions, political, social and economic." 4
Reapportionment confronted the Court with a similar problem. Several commentators have suggested the reapportionment
cases should have been analyzed under the guarantee clause,8 5
which might have allowed for a more realistic, flexible analysis of
political representation than the Court's rather mechanical "one
person, one vote" rule.8 6 Once again, the problem is not that the
8 See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction after Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 653, 659 & n.36 (1985).
81Id. Justice Marshall disagreed with the Heckler v. Chaney holding that agency inaction is presumptively unreviewable; he argued that the presumption should be in favor of
review but that courts should defer on the merits to agency decisions. Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 840-55 (1985) (concurring in the judgment).
82 307 U.S. 433 (1939).

83 Id. at 452.
84 Id. at 453-54 (arguing that such data "can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice" but should be considered by Congress
when it fixes a "reasonable limit of time").
8 See, e.g., Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 118-19 n.* (cited in note 5); Bork, 47 Ind.
L. J. at 18-19 (cited in note 5); Bonfield, 50 Cal. L. Rev. at 254-62 (cited in note 5) (malapportionment sanctioned by state constitution could be addressed under the guarantee
clause).
88 Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (establishing "one man, one vote" rule). See also Baker, 369
U.S. at 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("what is reasonable for equal-protection purposes
will depend upon what frame of government, basically, is allowed"); Ely, Democracy and
Distrust at 122 (cited in note 5) (assumptions underlying voting equality flow from guarantee clause).

19871

Guarantee of Republican Government

guarantee clause suggests no standard. For example, Justice Stewart's alternative standard-an apportionment must not allow "the
systematic frustration of the will of the majority of the electorate
of the State" 87 -seems to flow from the guarantee clause, not from
equal protection concerns. 85 Under this standard, deviations from
mathematical equality-for example, greater value of rural
votes-might have been offset by other factors in the practical distribution of power-for example, stronger organization of urban
votes. 89
As in Coleman, however, such a standard is arguably unmanageable, involving the courts in "difficult and unseemly inquiries
into the power alignments prevalent in the various states whose
plans came before them."9 0 In this sense, the guarantee clause
might be said to provide no "judicially manageable standards" for
resolving the particular issue of reapportionment.9 1 Thus, the
Court turned to the more easily administrable "one person, one
vote" standard, which fits more comfortably with equal protection
analysis.92
The manageability bar to justiciability causes concern because
it is hard to discern any limit to such a prudential rule of avoiding
hard cases, let alone authority or history to support its exercise. In
Coleman, for instance, the Court declined to enforce a "reasonableness" standard even though such standards, cabined by the application of intelligible guidelines, are routinely enforced in both
common law93 and constitutional 4 adjudication. Furthermore,
when reluctant to make fact-bound determinations as a matter of

3,See Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
88See Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 19 (cited in note 5) (guarantee supports flexible "majority
will" standard focusing on democratic process, not "one person, one vote" standard based
on individual rights).
81 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 122 & n.58 (cited in note 5), citing Baker, 369
U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 346-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Comment, Baker v.
Carr and Legislative Apportionment: A Problem of Standards, 72 Yale L. J. 968 (1963).
Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
J0
Between Law and Political Science, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 169, 246-47 (1968).
9, Baker, 369 U.S. at 223.
," The alternative of not acting at all was unpalatable given the severe inequities in
many states. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 124 (cited in note 5).
" See generally W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts §§ 28-36 (1984) (discussing the history and
application of the reasonableness standard in tort).
"1 See, for example, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (reviewing police discretion
to use deadly force in arrest under the fourth amendment requirement that seizures be
reasonable).
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constitutional law, the Court on occasion has adopted prophylactic
rules as a rough surrogate for enforcement of less manageable standards, as the reapportionment cases themselves may exemplify.95
While this approach is not without problems, it is preferable to the
complete abdication of judicial review."8 In any case, even if the
unmanageability rationale might explain the result in Baker, it utterly fails to support a per se rule of nonjusticiability.
C.

Other Difficulties with the Nonjusticiability Rule

1. The guarantee clause and individual rights. The other
factors listed in Baker97 have played little or no role in subsequent
"political question" analysis,"8 and at no time has the Court related them to the guarantee clause. Professor Laurence Tribe proposes an alternative theory: he asserts that "political questions"
arise under constitutional provisions that do not create judicially
enforceable individual rights. 99 The guarantee clause, which focuses primarily on ensuring sound governmental process rather
than protecting minority rights, 00 is arguably such a provision.
Tribe's theory, however, may simply be inapplicable to the
guarantee clause inasmuch as the clause confers an individual right
to be governed by republican institutions, 101 a right that trumps
majority rule. The framers understood the guarantee clause to forbid even a majority from alienating the right to republican
government.10 2
Moreover, Tribe's general proposition may be unsound. Other
structural guarantees of the Constitution that do not directly protect individual rights provide a basis for private action where the
" In addition, there are many ready examples in the criminal context. For example,
compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), adopting a prophylactic rule to enforce
fifth amendment rights, with the unwieldy "voluntariness" inquiry that had been applied
earlier in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
"6 See Wechsler, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 9 (cited in note 49) (arguing that the Court must
take jurisdiction unless the Constitution forbids it). However, others argue that many advantages may accrue when courts refuse to adjudicate such cases. Prudential barriers to
justiciability are identified and endorsed in Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961), revised and reprinted in Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch (1962).
"' See note 25 above.
"' In Powell v. McCormack, for example, the Court focused almost entirely on the
question of textual commitment. See notes 53-55 above.
' Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-16 at 72-73 (cited in note 2).
10 Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 694-99 (cited in note 5).
101 See the discussion at notes 66-75 above.
102 For example, the clause was intended to prohibit a state from creating a monarchy.
See text at notes 115-17.
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injury derives from an allegedly improper structure of decision
making. The separation of powers is such a guarantee. In INS v.
10
Chadha,
3 for example, the Court overturned a deportation order
because it had been improperly authorized by legislative veto, and
in Schechter Corp. v. United States,104 the Court invalidated a
delegation of Congress's lawmaking authority to a private group.
Cases such as these undermine the conclusion in Pacific Telephone
that a plaintiff could not challenge an otherwise legitimate tax
merely on the ground that it was promulgated through an uncon10 5
stitutional process.
2. State courts and the per se rule. The nonjusticiability rule
poses another difficulty. To the extent the political question doctrine is premised on article III, it does not bind state courts; and
even maxims of judicial prudence and restraint may place less
powerful constraints on state courts than on federal courts.10 6 State

103

462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Court in Chadha held that the deportee had standing to

challenge the constitutionality of the legislative veto because if the veto were declared unconstitutional and severable, the order deporting him would be rescinded. Id. at 935-36.
104 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935).
105 See Pacific Telephone, 223 U.S. at 140-41 (noting that the taxpayer claimed a right
to withhold his tax simply because the government was illegitimate).
106Article III does not, by its terms, apply to state courts. At least one state court has
expressly refused to adopt the federal doctrine relating to political questions, arguing that it
binds only federal courts. In Backman v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 549, 441
N.E.2d 523 (1982), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided the merits of a
claim that a state constitutional amendment was invalid because the legislature's approval
was procedurally defective. Rejecting arguments that the case presented a nonjusticiable
political question, both the majority and dissent refused to incorporate the federal rule as
part of state law. 387 Mass. at 554-56.
As to institutional and prudential concerns, state courts may be institutionally superior
to federal courts in defining and applying guarantee clause standards, standards that involve
politically sensitive judgments about the requirements of popular rule. Many state judges
are popularly selected. Many state courts already play a more active, politically sensitive
role in striking down excessive legislative delegations to agencies, see cases cited in Richard
Pierce, Sidney Shapiro, and Paul Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process 61-64 (1985),
and in granting standing for pure "public action" by representative plaintiffs, see Louis L.
Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1961).
State courts also continue to make law in the purest sense through the common law, as
federal courts generally may not. See, e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) (holding that a federal court in a diversity action must apply the substantive law of
the state in which it sits). See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1225 n.40, 1247-63
(arguing that state courts may be able to enforce federal constitutional norms in situations
where federal courts do not).
In any case, the Supreme Court has not imposed its justiciability rules on state courts.
But where such rules preclude review of state court decisions based on federal law, the
Court has not made clear whether the disposition of the issue is conclusive or merely advisory. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) ("We do not undertake to say that a state court may not render an opinion on a federal constitutional question
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courts appear to be free as a matter of federal law to address and
decide guarantee clause issues, and there seems to be no current
basis for the Supreme Court to vacate a state court judgment
under the guarantee clause on the ground of a "political question." 107 Nor, under the per se rule of nonjusticiability, may the
Court review the guarantee clause issue itself. The result is anomalous: judicial enforcement of a duty of "the United States" is undertaken by state courts without Supreme Court review to ensure
uniform and proper interpretation of the duty.108
III.

THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AND
REPUBLICANISM

As long as the Supreme Court persists in its weak substantive
view of the guarantee clause, lower federal courts will neither enforce the guarantee nor control its interpretation by state courts.109
Recent historical and theoretical work, however, has identified and
developed a far more vigorous conception of republican government-which has been called "deliberative democracy"11°--that
was prominent in the thought of the framers, particularly
Madison."" This conception balances the need for popular aceven under such circumstances that it can be regarded only as advisory. But, because our
own jurisdiction is cast in terms of 'case or controversy,' we cannot accept as the basis for

review, nor as the basis for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law without review,
any procedure which does not constitute such.").
10' Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. at 1248 (cited in note 106).
108 State courts' institutional competence does not alleviate the concerns over unchecked state court enforcement of a duty charged to the United States. The Doremus decision, cited in note 106, received substantial criticism for its refusal, on standing grounds, to
review or vacate a state court decision that Bible readings in public schools did not violate
the establishment clause. See, e.g., Edmund Cahn, ed., Supreme Court and Supreme Law 35
(1954) (comment of Professor Paul Freund) (advocating federal law of justiciability to bind
state courts as well as federal courts).
1o See cases cited in note 29 above.
110 See Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majoritarian Principle in Republican Government, in Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, eds., How Democratic is the Constitution? 102 (1980), cited in Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 45 n.72 (1985).
11 These works include, e.g., Sunstein, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (cited in note 110); David
Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (1984); John Greville Agard Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment (1975). For an extensive treatment of the development of republican
thought in the colonies and the new nation, see Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969). Although Madison's understanding obviously was not
shared by all the framers, his views are particularly important because of his prominence in
shaping both the guarantee clause and the Constitution as a whole. See Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause at 64 (cited in note 1) (noting that the guarantee clause was largely Madison's
creation).
Nor was the deliberative vision identified here the only strain in Madisonian thought;
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countability of government with the need for resistance of factional domination. 112 Exploration of the framers' vision of republicanism highlights the historical weakness of the Court's current
ineffectual interpretation of the guarantee clause and provides a
compelling source of standards for judicial review of state action in
both state and federal courts.
A.

The Framers' Purposes

The Philadelphia delegates generally agreed on the need for a
federal guarantee of republican government in each state, as well
as the purposes such a guarantee would serve. The Revolution had
been fueled by a commitment to self-government directly by the
people-which the revolutionaries understood as the basic principle of "republicanism." ' 3 But that fundamental commitment
faced serious threats under the Articles of Confederation. During
the 1780s, violent insurrections had rocked several states and hampered their governments, while the confederation government
stood by, powerless to intervene. 1 4 These events produced not
only dissatisfaction with the confederation's weakness, but also
pessimism about the viability of popular government in America
and even some sentiment for establishment of a monarchy.1 1 5 To
many of the framers, the first evil led to the second: weak, factionbeset government unable to maintain order would bring on unchecked government that would restore order only at the cost of
tyranny. 116
The disorders of the 1780s led Madison and others to insist
not only that the confederation government be strengthened, but
that it be specifically empowered to intervene when necessary to
preserve republican government-that is, popular government-against both factional insurrections and attempts to impose
monarchy. 11 7 Before the Philadelphia convention, Madison sugthere were pluralist elements as well. See Sunstein, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 72 & n.77 (cited in
note 110 and authorities cited therein).
"1 Sunstein, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 45.
H3 See generally Wood, Creation of the Republic 46-90, 162-96 (cited in note 111);
Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Forewords Traces of Self-Government,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 38 (1986).
' The most notable was Shay's Rebellion, an uprising of Massachusetts farmers fueled by economic depression, land speculation, and farm foreclosures. See Wiecek, The
Guarantee Clause at 27-37 (cited in note 1).
,,5Id. at 43-49. For example, rumors abounded that Congress intended to call a German prince of the house of Brandenburg or Osnaburgh to establish an American regency.
,,6Id. at 49.
" Id. at 28: "A new constitution was not of itself sufficient to allay [the nationalists']
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gested "guaranteeing the tranquility of the states against internal
as well as external danger." 118 At the convention, he proposed
rather "that a Republican Government and the territory of each
State . . . ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each
State,"11 9 language that both extended the principle beyond cases
of violent insurrection and more directly proscribed monarchy. In
the floor debates, however, some objected that such wording was
too broad for the provision's purpose of merely preserving order,
and for a time the "republican government" language was deleted.120 But John Randolph insisted on an independent guarantee
of republican government, and so the clause as approved included
both provisions: "that a republican form of government shall be
guaranteed to each state, and that each state shall be protected
against foreign and domestic violence. ' 121 The clause as adopted
reads almost the same.
The Federalist Papers likewise reflect these two understandings of the guarantee clause. Hamilton emphasized the protections
against insurrection and counterrevolution, writing that the clause
"could be no impediment to reforms of State Constitutions by a
majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode" but "could
1 22
only operate against changes to be effected by violence.'
In contrast, Madison, the chief "framer" of the clause, showed
a broader understanding. In FederalistNo. 43, he confirmed that
the existing state governments were republican and suggested that
the federal guarantee power might prove only a "harmless superfluity.' 23 But he also argued that the guarantee would be "as
much leveled against the usurpations of rulers as against the fer24
ments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community"'
and warned: "who can say what experiments may be produced by

fears. They needed, in addition, an explicit assurance that a threatened state could look to
the national government to put down rebellion."
118James Madison, Letter to Edmund Randolph, Apr. 8, 1787, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., 2
The Writings of James Madison, 1783-1787 at 340 (1901).
19 Max Farrand, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 22 (May 29) (rev.
ed. 1937) ("Records"). For discussion of the debate on the guarantee clause, see Wiecek,
The Guarantee Clause at 51-63 (cited in note 1); Bonfield, 46 Minn. L. Rev. at 516-20 (cited
in note 1).
120 Farrand, 2 Records at 47-49 (July 18) (cited in note 119).
121 Id.; Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause at 57-58 (cited in note 1).
122 The Federalist Papers No. 21 at 140 (cited in note 39) (Hamilton). But consider
text at note 119 above, arguing that the convention's addition of a separate "republican
government" clause to the guarantee against domestic violence suggests a role for the republican government clause beyond suppression of domestic violence.
122 Federalist No. 43 at 275 (Madison).
124 Id. No. 21 at 140.
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the caprice of particular States?112 5 And elsewhere, Madison's conception of republican government-which he took to mean representative government12 8-- was distinctive and powerful. His theory
of republicanism demanded that governmental actors deliberate
over decisions rather than simply ratify the demands of self-interested groups. While the structural safeguards of the Constitution
provided for specific institutional protection of these values at the
federal level, the text preserves these same values at the state level
in the more general guarantee of republican form.
B.

The Theory of Republicanism

This conception of "republican government" contemplated decision makers who would engage in a deliberative process of identifying and pursuing policies that serve some common good.1 7 Decisions were not to be mere expressions of the self-interested
preferences of those able to wield sufficient political control over
the decision makers; rather the process itself would include an independent evaluation of the ends sought by various interests.
This vision is distinguishable from the conception of modern
interest group pluralists, who see the legislative process as a bargaining process among various self-interested groups. In the pluralist conception, legislation need not and does not reflect a deliberative choice by legislators, but rather the interests and goals of
those who wield sufficient political power to get the requisite number of votes. 28
The conception of republicanism described by the framers,
particularly Madison, takes popular rule as its fundamental principle. As Madison wrote in Federalist No. 39, republican government "derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people.""2 9 The success of popular rule in the classical
republics, however, was thought to have depended both on their
small size and on a high degree of "civic virtue" in their citizens.13 0
125 Id. No. 43 at 275.
1,6 Id. No. 14 at 100 ("in a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in
person; in a republic they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents");
id. No. 10 at 81 (republic is "a government in which the scheme of representation takes
place").
127 As noted, much recent scholarship has sought to refine the framers' conception of
republican government. See, for example, authorities cited in note 111 above.
12' See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 26-31.
12I Federalist No. 39 at 241.
130 For extensive discussion of the classical republican model, see Wood, Creation of

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:208

Only in an extremely small polity could the citizenry meet together
to pass laws; and only where the citizens were strongly publicminded could they faithfully discharge the duty of making sound
decisions for the entire community. 131 In the Madisonian view,
neither condition was present in the American states: most states
were far larger and more populous than the classic republics, and
the experience of the confederation years made many people de13 2
spair of the citizens' capacity for civic virtue.
Madison identified the confederation's want of civic virtue
with the problem of "faction," which he regarded as the primary
threat to stable popular government.1 33 In Federalist No. 10, he
defined a "faction" as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to
a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate good of
the community."'1 84 The goal was to prevent a faction from gaining
effective control over the decision-making process and using the
process to advance its narrow interests at the expense of others'
interests and the public good. 3 5 The framers contemplated controls even on majority factions, in order to preserve both the public
interest and the stability of majority rule.
FederalistNo. 10 identified the remedy as representative government, and this became the Madisonian sense of "republic."' 36
While direct popular rule-that is, "democracy"' 3 7- could offer no
relief from the power of a majority faction,-38 Madison argued that
representatives would be more likely to decide in a deliberative
fashion and not simply defer to powerful private interests:
The effect of [representation] is . . .to refine and enlarge the
public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true inthe Republic ch. 2 at 46-90 (cited in note 111).
'31 See Federalist No. 14 at 100-01 (discussing limits on size of direct democracies);
Wood, Creation of the Republic at 53-70 (discussing republican requirements of civic virtue
and sacrifice of individual interests to public good).
132See Wood, Creation of the Republic ch. 10 at 393-429 (discussing disappointment of
republican ideals in 1780s); Federalist No. 10 at 79 (noting that men are "much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good").
"33Federalist No. 10 at 79.
"3
Id. at 78.
131 See Sunstein, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 38-45 (cited in note 110).
138See note 126 above. See Michelman, 100 Harv. L. Rev. at 36 (cited in note 113)
(noting tension in republican thought between direct and representative democracy).
137 Federalist No. 10 at 81.
138Id.; Federalist No. 14 at 100.
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terest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation it may well happen
that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of
the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the
purpose.1 3 9
However, representation alone would not ensure deliberative
law making, for local representatives might not resist the factional
power.14 0 The creation of a national government provided at least a
partial further remedy. A national body of representatives, with
authority over enumerated areas of national concern,14 1 would
comprehend a variety of local interests without being subject to
42
any one of them.1
C.

Summary: Two Guarantee Clause Values

The guarantee of republican government thus embodies two
values. The first, accountability of government decision makers to
the people, is evident in the framers' clear intent that the clause
would prohibit monarchy or aristocracy in any state. The second
value is that government decisions be made deliberatively and by
reference to a public value, rather than by simply deferring to the
interests of powerful private groups. This value is evident in the
framers' particular concern with control of governmental processes
by self-interested factions-a concern that specifically led to adoption of the guarantee clause-and in the Madisonian device of representation as a tool for increasing deliberation in government.
These values often conflict. In the framers' understanding, extreme governmental accountability, as in a democracy, amounted
to rule by the whim of the masses-short-sighted and unre"I Federalist No. 10 at 82.

110 Id. ("Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs may...

betray the interests of the people.").
"1 Id. at 83 ("the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local
and particular to the State legislatures").
This does not mean, though, that the framers relied entirely on the allocation of certain
decisions to the national government to control the influence of local interests. In addition,
through the guarantee clause they directly authorized federal intervention in the affairs of
the states to ensure that they conformed to republican principles. See text at note 117
above, noting that in addition to strengthening the national government, the nationalists
demanded it be authorized to intervene to preserve republican government.
"1 Id. at 83-84 ("The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other

States.").

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:208

strained. Divorcing government from popular pressure freed rulers
to strive for public good; but it provided no orderly mechanism to
guide and correct misperceptions of the common interest nor any
peaceable remedy for governance purely by the self-interest of the
sovereign. The framers' republicanism was an attempt, through the
system of representation, to achieve a balance between these two
countervailing forces with the benefit of both and the burdens of
neither. The guarantee clause charged the federal government,
safeguarded from local factional power, with the preservation of
the structure of state government necessary to maintain the dynamic between these two values.
IV.

AREAS FOR GUARANTEE CLAUSE

REvIEW

Identification of the vision underlying the guarantee
clause-representative government to ensure popular accountability and deliberative decision making-provides a new perspective
on the appropriate role of the federal judiciary in the enforcement
of these values. In the modern constitutional structure, it is the
particular role of the judiciary to ensure that other governmental
actors make their decisions in deliberative fashion. 143 In particular,
a number of issues implicating constitutional rights and values
would be better resolved by enforcement of the guarantee clause
rather than by judicial abstention. As discussed in the following
section, federal judicial enforcement of the clause in issues of state
delegation of legislative power, direct popular rule, and rationality
review, advances rather than impedes the framers' objective of ensuring the republican form of government.
A.

Legislative Delegations

Under the federal nondelegation doctrine,4 Congress may not
delegate lawmaking power to administrative agencies or private
groups without establishing standards to control those actors' dis'1 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,Inc., 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1373, 1411-12 (1978).
144 Both

at the state and federal level, strictures against delegation of legislative power

are part of the broader scheme of separation of powers. This comment does not address the
issue of what aspects of a system of separated powers might be required of the states by the
guarantee clause. For contrasting views, see Van Sickle, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (separation of powers required); and In re Interrogatories H.B. 1078, 189 Colo. 1, 536 P.2d 308
(separation of powers not required), both discussed above at notes 37-41 and accompanying

text. The nondelegation doctrine, however, is particularly consistent with the principles underlying the guarantee clause because of its insistence that fundamental policy decisions be

made by elected representatives.
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cretion."1 5 The doctrine serves three purposes: ensuring that important policy choices are made by Congress, the branch "most responsive to the popular will"; providing "intelligible principles" to
guide agencies in exercising delegated power; and providing "ascertainable standards" for courts reviewing agency action.1 46 The first
two of these purposes reflect the value of accountability underlying
government by elected representatives. The third reflects the importance of deliberative decision making and the courts' role in ensuring it.
Agencies are insulated in varying degrees from popular pressure. At one time it was widely agreed that because of their "insulation," agencies would set policy more rationally than would legislatures.147 In this view, delegation of lawmaking power to agencies
exchanged a degree of accountability for a degree of deliberativeness. Experience with agencies, however, has raised doubts
whether their reduced accountability has resulted in more deliberative decisions; today an agency may be more prone than the legislature to "capture" by the group it is supposed to regulate, both
because of the agency's limited focus and because of its very
148
insulation.
It is at least clear, in any case, that a grant of unbridled lawmaking authority to largely unaccountable private groups severely
threatens both deliberation and accountability in government.
This double threat accounts for the greater scrutiny accorded delegations to private entities, as exemplified by the Schechter Poultry
case. 149

The nondelegation doctrine has lain dormant since the 1930s,
as the complexity of modern government regulation has made it
difficult for Congress to do more than set very broad policy direc145 See Schechter Corp., 295 U.S. at 530; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388

(1935); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
146 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"' This was certainly the belief of proponents of the New Deal's administrative state.
For a prime example, see James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938).
248 See generally Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (2d ed. 1979); Richard A.
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. and Mgmt. Sci. 335 (1974) (discussing "capture" theory of administrative regulation).
149 295 U.S. at 521-27. A more recent nondelegation case identified delegation to private groups as an important factor in Schechter. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,
337 F.Supp. 737, 763 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970). See
also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689,
1691 (1984) ("no coincidence" that the leading nondelegation case involved delegation to
private groups); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201 (1937).
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tives.'1 0 But some justices and academic commentators recently
have urged the doctrine's revival. They argue that agencies are
prone to improper influence by special interests, that Congress
does have the expertise (if not the political will) to make difficult
policy choices, and that even a strengthened nondelegation doctrine requires only that Congress articulate some standard for
151
agencies and other branches to follow.
Application of a strengthened, though still flexible, nondelegation doctrine against state governments would satisfy Madison's
concerns with deliberation and accountability, and so give effect to
the guarantee he advocated. As John Hart Ely has argued, enforcement of the nondelegation principle against the states is appropriate because policy making by elected officials is close to the "core
meaning" of the guarantee clause. 152 Yet a fairly long tradition
holds that the nondelegation dottrine does not apply to the states
as a matter of either due process or the guarantee clause. In Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 5 ' the Court refused to strike down on
nondelegation grounds a state statute creating a regulatory agency,
holding that "[h]ow power shall be distributed by a state among its
governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the
state itself.' 54 Recently, in United Beverage Co. v. Ind. Alcoholic
Beverage Comm'n, 55 the Seventh Circuit relied on Highland
Farms in concluding that there is no general nondelegation stricture against the states, although delegations may be challenged in
particular
contexts identified
by specific
constitutional
56
provisions.1
In defense of the Highland Farms rule, the court of appeals in

150 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88

Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1695-96 & n.27 (1975); Pierce et al., Administrative Law § 3.1 at 43-47
(cited in note 106).
151 See, e.g., Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 686-87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); American
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined
by Burger, C.J.); Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 131-34 (cited in note 5); Lowi, End of
Liberalism at 129-46, 297-99 (cited in note 148); J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary
Justice, 81 Yale L. J. 575, 582-87 (1972).
151Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 240-41 n.78 (cited in note 5).
153300 U.S. 608 (1937).
'5'Id. at 612.
156 760 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting nondelegation challenge to liquor commission
regulation).
'5'Id. at 158-59. The special contexts mentioned by the Seventh Circuit include delegation to a religious group in violation of the establishment clause, Larkin v. Grendel's Den
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), and insufficiently precise criminal statutes (especially those regulating speech) that effectively delegate definitional authority to the police officers and other
officers who enforce the statutes, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).

1987]

Guarantee of Republican Government

United Beverage argued: "the danger of concentrated political
power that called forth the separation of powers at the federal
level is much less acute at the state level. If you didn't like Huey
Long's Louisiana, you could move to a different state; tyranny at
the federal level is more difficult to escape. "157 This argument
overlooks that, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the issue is whether the evil contemplated by the framers will occur in a
state, not whether one can escape the evil afterwards. The Constitution "guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government." The fact that a citizen may flee from one
state to another is irrelevant in the determination of whether
"every State" has conformed its government to the constitutional
mandate. Otherwise, proof that one could flee to a state with a
constitutionally sound system logically could defeat any federal
constitutional right enforceable against the states.
The guarantee clause should be the basis for enforcing the
nondelegation principle against the states. Highland Farms does
not prove that state legislatures are entirely free to delegate power,
for the challenged delegation was probably permissible even under
the federal standard. 15 8 In any case, the Highland Farms rule is
insufficiently sensitive to the danger of factional power in a state.
Contrary to the court's claim in United Beverage, this concern is
greater at the state than at the federal level, according to the
Madisonian theory: a powerful local group is more likely to gain
effective hold over a state agency than over a federal one. 59 That
some state courts are more strict in reviewing legislative delegations'60 may reflect recognition that such delegations at the state
level present the greater danger to republican values.
B.

Limits on Direct Popular Rule

While courts occasionally strike down delegations to administrative agencies and private groups, they almost never hold that
United Beverage, 760 F.2d at 158.
"Nothing in the distribution here attempted supplies the basis for an exception [to
the freedom of state government structures]." 300 U.S. at 612.
155 See Federalist No. 10 at 83-84.
110See Pierce et al., Administrative Law § 3.4.5 (cited in note 106); Kenneth Culp Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 3.14 (3d ed. 1983); Hans A. Linde, George Bunn,
Fredericka Paff, and W. Lawrence Church, Legislative and Administrative Processes 477-78
(2d ed. 1981).
An additional problem when a state delegation is at issue is that it may be more difficult to find sufficient legislative history to define a satisfactory standard, as courts often do
in federal nondelegation cases. See Linde et al., Legislative Processes at 477-78.
157
158
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delegations of the lawmaking power back to the electorate are invalid in themselves. 6 1 Challenges to the validity of decision making by initiative or referendum have almost uniformly failed. The
only exception has been in the context of racial classifications
adopted by direct popular vote; 62 and even there the difficulty is
generally with the substance of the enactment rather than the procedure by which it is passed. 63
The first challenge to plebiscitary measures to reach the Supreme Court was the taxpayer's "frontal assault"' 61 4 in Pacific
Telephone: an undifferentiated claim, based on the guarantee
clause, that the initiative and referendum were in all cases impermissible forms of legislation. The Court skirted the issue, but lower
court decisions have firmly established the basic permissibility of
such measures.1 6 5 The Court has, however, established due process
limits to zoning initiatives and referenda by striking down ordinances that required the approval of neighboring property owners
for issuance of a zoning variance. 166
But in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,67 the
Court virtually disclaimed any constitutional limits on direct legislation, upholding a zoning law requiring a referendum of all property owners in a city before a zoning variance could issue. Commending the referendum as an admirable example of reclamation
of legislative power by the people, 68 the Court distinguished the
due process zoning cases by arguing that they involved the votes of
a few property owners-that is, essentially delegation to a private
group-rather than the entire electorate." 9 Justice Stevens dis161Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. at 1408 (cited in note 143); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 195, 227-28 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating state initiative measure guaranteeing owner's right to sell property to those he desired); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 387 (1969) (invalidating ordinance requiring majority vote of electorate to approve
any ordinance regulating real estate transactions on the basis of race); Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down state constitutional amendment requiring all busing plans for racial integration to be approved by referendum). But see James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding state initiative measure requiring majority vote of
electorate to approve local government involvement in low-income housing).
163 Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. at 1407-08 (cited in note 143).
164 Id. at 1405.
161 See cases cited above in note 70.
166

Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S.

116 (1928).
167 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
168 Id. at 672-73, 675 (referendum is not a delegation of power, but rather a reservation
by the people, from whom the power derives).
169 Id. at 678.
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sented strongly, arguing that the unmediated exercise of legislative
power by the majority against those seeking zoning variances
vio170
lated due process by circumventing the legislative process.
Stevens's argument, echoed by some commentators, is for a
"due process of lawmaking": the legislative process understood as a
safeguard against unrestrained exercises of power by the majority
or by significant and cohesive minorities. 17' The argument has met
much criticism, 7 2 and it generally has not been influential on the
Court.'73 The Court has underestimated the constitutional force of
the argument that the representative scheme is designed to ensure
a form of deliberative government: "due process of lawmaking" is
merely shorthand for the type of decision making that the framers
sought to ensure by requiring a republican form of state government. The guarantee clause, properly conceived, should be the basis on which to limit resort to referenda and initiatives.
Direct exercise of legislative power by the people does, of
course, increase accountability. Yet, as Professor Hans Linde observed, it is inconsistent with the notion that decision making
should be deliberative:
An obligation that lawmakers design and evaluate every law
as a means to an end beyond itself would demand of policymaking the rational procedures of policy implementation. If
there is any doubt that due process makes no such demands
on the process of political decision, the ultimate test of the
theory lies in that pride and joy of western lawmaking, the
popular initiative. Initiated laws like all others must meet
170 Id. at 680. "[Tjhe popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the
rights of individual litigants." Id. at 693. "[I]t is elementary that the decisionmaker must be
impartial and qualified to understand and to apply the controlling rules." Id. Justice Stevens also quoted approvingly at length the state supreme court's opinion invalidating the
referendum provision:

Due process of law requires that procedures for the exercise of municipal power be
structured such that fundamental choices among competing municipal policies are resolved by a responsible organ of government. . . . The Eastlake charter provision ignored these concepts and blatantly delegated legislative authority, with no assurance
that the result reached thereby would be reasonable or rational.
Id. at 688-89, quoting Forest City Enterprises v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St.2d 187, 196,
324 N.E.2d 740, 746 (1975) (citations omitted).
171 See Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 1411-18.
172 See, e.g., Linde, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 195 (1976) (criticizing theories of rationality in the
legislative process) (cited in note 161).
173 See, e.g., Eastlake, 426 U.S. 668. But contrast Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.

88 (1976), in which the Court held that the exclusion of aliens from federal civil service jobs
violated due process because the interests offered to justify the exclusion were not within

the authority of the Civil Service Commission, which promulgated the policy, to consider.
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. But can it be contended that

one of those standards is a rational way of matching means to
ends? The initiative process flies in the face of the idea.
Whatever the private goals of the sponsors, once a measure is
drafted it is past systematic factfinding, analysis, amendment,
or compromise. .

.

. [T]he debate leading to decision is left to

the electioneering slogans of competing advertising firms. Yet
such a measure may repeal, alter, or contradict the most carefully studied and best designed enactment of the legislature.
If this mode of policy-making lacks some of the deliberative
virtues of a republican form of government,
that criticism
17 4
failed to move the Supreme Court.

The moral that Linde and others have drawn is that there is
no due process right to deliberative decision making. 175 But if, as
this comment has argued, the framers did intend the requirement
of republican government to enshrine the value of deliberation by
representative law makers, the conclusion instead must be that the
guarantee clause does limit the use of direct measures such as initiatives and referenda.
Defining those limits is difficult. And, notwithstanding the
claims of the unsuccessful Progressive Era litigants, it should not
follow that all plebiscitary measures are impermissible, just as not
all legislative delegations are impermissible. If a chief purpose of
representative government is that of ensuring an overall system of
law making conducive to deliberative decision making, then the
limits should be defined accordingly. Professor Lawrence Gene
Sager has suggested one approach to reviewing changes in the process of law making: courts should strike down a plebiscitary measure on due process grounds if (1) it deprives the litigant of an
interest recognized under the due process clause and (2) judicial
review of the substance of the measure is not vigorous enough to
ensure that it has been passed deliberatively and with reference to
some public end rather than with regard to purely private
interests. 176
Professor Sager's standard for plebiscitary measures may be
elaborated upon to make it analogous to the substantive requirements currently imposed upon congressional delegations to federal
agencies. Congress may transfer some degree of decision making to
174Linde, 55 Neb. L. Rev. at 227-28 (cited in note 161).
17 Id.
176 Sager, Insular Majorities, 91 Harv. L. Rev. at 1418 (cited in note 143).
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less accountable agencies, but only if it makes the basic policy
choices itself.1 77 The body choosing the public policy objective
must be highly accountable while the body selecting the means to
achieve that end may be more insulated and deliberative. Since
Congress has set the policy objective, the courts have a basis upon
which to effectively review agency action.
By comparison, the increased accountability of initiatives and
referenda suggests that these plebiscitary forms are appropriate for
setting broad policy objectives. But decisions about how to implement these policies should be reserved to the state or local legislature, a more deliberative body. This division reduces the threat of
factional excess.
It is true that the vision of deliberative government described
here focuses on ends as much on means: that is, it is intended to
identify government actions that simply ratify the goals of powerful self-interested groups. But broad policy decisions offer safeguards against purely self-interested decision making. Referenda
decisions are more likely to be motivated by a sense of public good
rather than private interest if, when voting, the citizens must decide the merits of a public policy without knowing exactly how its
implementation will affect them personally." 8 Moreover, judicial
review can identify impermissible ends behind a broad policy
choice, even if the choice is made directly by the electorate; but as
a case involves more technical questions of implementing policy
choices, judicial review becomes more deferential and thus less effective at ensuring deliberative decision making.' 79
Under this elaboration of Sager's suggested standard, a referendum on general city planning policy would not violate the guarantee clause (although the measure's substance might be subject to
attack on other constitutional grounds). But a referendum, like
that in Eastlake, on the desirability of a particular zoning variance, should be struck down as inconsistent with a republican form
of government. The danger of a result based primarily on evaluation of personal benefit rather than belief in the public good is
acute in the Eastlake scenario. 8 0 Furthermore, effective judicial
See text accompanying notes 149-50 above.
178Consider John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11-12 (1971). Rawls suggests that the just
177

society is based on social rules arrived at voluntarily by men in a state of equality. The
principle feature of his initial state of equality is that no one knows what his ultimate place
in society will be.
179See Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. at 1418-23 (cited in note 143).
Id. at 1411 ("the real objection to the Eastlake rezoning referendum requirement
lies in the unreflective, nondeliberative aggregate will of the electorate as the basis for lot-
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review of such a measure's substance is unlikely because in zoning
decisions, courts traditionally give great deference to the decisions
of legislative and administrative bodies.
In sum, then, the proposal provides an intelligible standard by
which to enforce guarantee clause values: if the substance of the
referendum or initiative is so "means-oriented" as to increase the
risk of factional behavior and to foreclose meaningful judicial review, one safeguard of deliberative government, then the safeguard
of representative decision making must be observed. This standard
parallels the conditions placed on legislative delegations to agencies and is equally manageable.
C.

Deliberative Government and Rationality Review

A final application of the concept of republican government
described here would be to bolster federal court review of state action under various constitutional provisions, particularly the equal
protection clause. Current equal protection doctrine requires at a
minimum that government action be rationally related to a permissible state purpose. 8 1 Legal theorists with a pluralist view of the
legislative process have had difficulty understanding even this minimal "rationality" requirement. 182 But it grows naturally out of the
conception of republicanism as "deliberative" government, under
which governmental decision makers must identify a public purpose for their actions, and out of the specific concern of the guarantee clause that special interests not enlist the governmental process to serve solely their own ends.
The first purpose a stronger conception of the guarantee
clause might serve, then, would be to provide textual authority for
general rationality review of state action. Yet rationality review, as
undertaken today, places but minimal constraints on legislative
and administrative decisions. The Court has been willing to accept
almost any purpose as permissible,' to accept post hoc purposes
not considered by the legislature itself,18 4 and even to hypothesize

by-lot determinations of zoning status").
181 See, e.g., U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
182 See, e.g., Linde, 55 Neb. L. Rev. at 201-22 (cited in note 161); Posner, 1974 S. Ct.
Rev. at 27-29 (cited in note 128).
183 For exceptions, see City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985) ("irrational" prejudice against mentally retarded an impermissible motivation); U.S.
Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) ("bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group" impermissible).
184 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 237
(1981).
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purposes entirely on its own initiative. 18 5 Although in some recent
cases, the Court has appeared almost intuitively to subject classifi186 it is uncations to closer scrutiny for impermissible purposes,
1 87
development.
this
clear how far it intends to take
The concept of deliberative government could play a significant role in strengthening judicial scrutiny, as Professor Sunstein
has argued. 188 At the very least, the notion of deliberative decision
making would seem to require that the purpose offered in justification of a governmental action be one that the governmental decision maker actually considered. 189 Such a requirement would be a
significant departure from traditional rationality review, and although the legislature often might evade such scrutiny by boilerplate language, the airing of actual purposes might expose some
actions as lacking any public justification. 9 0 In addition, this deliberation requirement would more powerfully ensure that the legislature would choose means reasonably well suited to achieve the desired end.'
Objections to such proposals for more exacting judicial scrutiny have focused first on the lack of any textual authority. 9 The
guarantee clause provides such authority, once it is understood in
the sense identified in this comment. A second objection is that
courts lack the competence to engage in complex determinations
about legislative intent, the advisability of a particular means chosen, or the extent to which policy is the product of deliberation
rather than interest group pressure. 9 3 But the inquiry into legislative motivation, although not without difficulties, is a task that

185 See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960); Robert W. Bennett, "Mere"
Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Cal. L. Rev.
1049, 1057 (1979).
'86 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Comment, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1454 (1986); Comment, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1184 (1986).
:87 See Comment, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1471-83 (cited in note 186).
8 See Sunstein, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 69-72 (cited in note 110) (suggesting courts should
no longer hypothesize legitimate purposes and should require a closer fit between means and
ends).
289 Id. See also Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1972) (arguing
that this requirement would encourage "a fuller airing in the political arena of the grounds
for legislative action").
,90 Sunstein, 38 Stan. L. Rev. at 78 (cited in note 110).
"9 Id. at 69-72.
19 Id. at 77 and n.205 (discussing objection that courts lack authority to require
greater rationality in legislation).
193 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (describing the hazards of
inquiry into legislative motive); Posner, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. at 29 (cited in note 128).
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courts generally regard as familiar.19 4 At any rate, even if the requirement of deliberativeness is somewhat "underenforced," this is
for familiar reasons of institutional competence rather than the
weak arguments offered for the per se nonjusticiability rule.
CONCLUSION

The guarantee of a republican form of government remains almost entirely neglected by the federal judiciary on the ground that
it raises only nonjusticiable "political questions." But this longstanding rule rests in significant part on an implicit determination
by the courts that the guarantee clause does no more than prohibit
extraordinary departures from or breakdowns in the system of
popular rule in a state.
The guarantee clause, however, embodies a more vigorous conception of republican government. This conception, identified particularly with Madison, relies on representative decision makers
who, while accountable to the people, also bear a responsibility to
deliberate in their decision making rather than respond mechanically to pressures from private groups. The guarantee of republican
government can be interpreted as authorizing federal intervention
to protect state governments from changes in form that would
jeopardize the deliberative model.
This substantive description of the guarantee clause compels
strengthened judicial review in several related contexts of constitutional law. The principle supports a general limit on state delegation of legislative power to state agencies and particularly to private groups. If vigorously enforced, it would impose limits even on
the ability of the electorate itself to bypass the deliberative representative process through initiative and referenda. Finally, on a
more theoretical level, the guarantee clause provides the textual
justification for a stronger version of rationality review than that
now exercised under other constitutional provisions.
Thomas C. Berg

194

For discussion of the various difficulties in ascertaining and evaluating legislative

motives, see John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205 (1970).

